The Gun Counter

http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2 ... his-24.php

This is interesting and way over due. It has been fustrating watching our rather slow progress. The desert screams for mobile warfare and when you have both a mobility and firepower advantage cutting off and surrounding them is exactly the correct method. They need to minimize any opportunity for them to surrender as well.

"What keeps you awake at night?"

"Nothing, I keep other people awake at night."

Mattis. For. President.

g-man wrote:"What keeps you awake at night?"

"Nothing, I keep other people awake at night."

Mattis. For. President.

That was a perfect line, delivered effortlessly.

g-man wrote:"What keeps you awake at night?"

"Nothing, I keep other people awake at night."

Mattis. For. President.

I geuss we can hope that some horrible scandal wipes out everyone ahead of him in the line of succession.

Kommander wrote:

g-man wrote:"What keeps you awake at night?"

"Nothing, I keep other people awake at night."

Mattis. For. President.

I geuss we can hope that some horrible scandal wipes out everyone ahead of him in the line of succession.

napalm works too. Just sayin

Vonz90 wrote:http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2 ... his-24.php

This is interesting and way over due. It has been fustrating watching our rather slow progress. The desert screams for mobile warfare and when you have both a mobility and firepower advantage cutting off and surrounding them is exactly the correct method. They need to minimize any opportunity for them to surrender as well.

Mobile/maneuver warfare requires troops that are equipped, and most importantly, trained to carry it out.

There is only one army, maybe two, in the region that have such capability. The Israelis, and maybe the Turks. Big maybe.

The U.S. Army today would have a tough time with maneuver warfare, and is currently working, slowly and painfully, to relearn what wasted away during the last 15+ years of COIN. Today's battalion and brigade commanders were LTs and CPTs when the GWOT started - COIN is all they've known for most of their careers. The old farts who knew how to do HIC maneuver war are wearing stars and driving desks, or retired and grousing over beers at the VFW.

Not to say the the Iraqis, and to lesser extent the Kurds, can't do evelopment and siege warfare. The IA should have the armor and artillery to do to Mosul what the Russians did in Grozny. The Kurds lack the hardware.

Annihilation warfare with the capabilities available in Iraq/Syria is going to be slow, grinding, and brutal.

Langenator wrote:

Vonz90 wrote:http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2 ... his-24.php

This is interesting and way over due. It has been fustrating watching our rather slow progress. The desert screams for mobile warfare and when you have both a mobility and firepower advantage cutting off and surrounding them is exactly the correct method. They need to minimize any opportunity for them to surrender as well.

Mobile/maneuver warfare requires troops that are equipped, and most importantly, trained to carry it out.

There is only one army, maybe two, in the region that have such capability. The Israelis, and maybe the Turks. Big maybe.

The U.S. Army today would have a tough time with maneuver warfare, and is currently working, slowly and painfully, to relearn what wasted away during the last 15+ years of COIN. Today's battalion and brigade commanders were LTs and CPTs when the GWOT started - COIN is all they've known for most of their careers. The old farts who knew how to do HIC maneuver war are wearing stars and driving desks, or retired and grousing over beers at the VFW.

Not to say the the Iraqis, and to lesser extent the Kurds, can't do evelopment and siege warfare. The IA should have the armor and artillery to do to Mosul what the Russians did in Grozny. The Kurds lack the hardware.

Annihilation warfare with the capabilities available in Iraq/Syria is going to be slow, grinding, and brutal.

True as such, but everything is relative to your opponent. ISIS has less firepower and tactical mobility than the Iraqis (and certainly with us there as well, which we are) - add to that their more vulnerable LOC's; it is definitely the way to go.

Even if the envelopment was done poorly, ISIS would have to concentrate in the open to make the allies pay for that mistake, and since they have no air cover and very little mechanized capability, that would play entirely into our hands anyway.

Getting around and surrounding a less mobile opponent in the open is not a new tactic and does not require mechanization per se; just better tactical mobility and at least equal firepower than the opponent. Frederick did it the Seven Years War a number of times and it wasn't new then either. I am not saying there is no risk, but he who will not risk cannot win.

Vonz90 wrote:They need to minimize any opportunity for them to surrender as well.

I was saying back during the runup to Afghanistan that the war aim ought to be, "We'll let you know when we're ready to accept your unconditional surrender."